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Abstract 
In recent years, many of the Commonwealth countries have experienced a reduction in income inequalities due 
to the development of financial markets and intermediaries. At the same time, widespread corruption among 
public officials, civil servants, or politicians from these countries have been well documented. A key public policy 
question is whether the return to financial sector development at the level of massive corruption, exacerbate 
income inequality, offsetting the benefits of financial development. Using a panel data of 30 Commonwealth 
countries over the period of 1995–2008, it is found that the high rates of corruption in the Commonwealth 
countries are crowding out the return to financial development. The return to financial development on income 
inequality, at the level of higher corruption, are positive for all countries and significantly larger for the low- and 
middle-income countries compared to high-income countries, which suggest that the complementary nature of 
policies that simultaneously reduce corruption and promote financial development have a greater impact in 
reducing income inequality than implementing these policies separately. 
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I Introduction 
There is an increasing recognition in the public domain that corruption and other aspects of poor governance 
have substantial adverse effects on the distribution of income. Corruption has direct and indirect consequences 
on economic and governance factors, which in turn exacerbate inequality. Much of the literature on corruption 
and inequality is recent – from the mid-1990s – when major international donor institutions began to focus 
attention on corruption issues and researchers initiated cross-country measurements of the corruption 
phenomenon. 
While the research over the impact of corruption on inequality has continued, another major issue has emerged 
on the international development agenda. This is the finance–inequality relationship (Claessens and Perotti, 
2007). Although, a large literature suggests that financial development leads to faster average growth (Levine, 
2005), researchers have not yet determined whether financial development benefits the entire population 
equally or whether it disproportionately benefits a certain section of the population. If financial development 
increases income inequality, this income distribution effect will mitigate or even negate the beneficial effects of 
financial development on the poor (Ang, 2010; Beck et al., 2007). 
The Commonwealth countries1 span Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe and the Pacific and are diverse – they are 
amongst the world’s largest, smallest, richest and poorest countries. Corruption and income inequality pose 
significant risks in the growth process for a number of Commonwealth countries. A total of 53 Commonwealth 
countries with 1.8 billion people bear a disproportionate burden of global poverty and income inequality. The 
Commonwealth is home to one-third of the world’s population, but two-thirds of global HIV/AIDS cases, two-
thirds of maternal deaths, two-thirds of children under five suffering from malnutrition, and nearly half the 
infant deaths in the world. Income inequality is increasing in many low- and middle-income Commonwealth 
countries and this indicates that gains from economic growth are not necessarily reflected in better health and 
improved life chances for the poorest. Poverty remains the single greatest killer in the Commonwealth, with 
differential life chances between rich and poor starkly reflected in maternal mortality statistics. 
A total of 19 Commonwealth countries are ranked in the bottom half of Transparency International’s 2007 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Bangladesh, Kenya and Nigeria occupy positions in the bottom 30 of the 
index. For instance, it is estimated that corruption has cost Nigeria over US$ 400 billion, which is equivalent to 
approximately two-thirds of the total amount of aid given to Africa since the 1960s (Khemani, 2008). Aware of 
its crippling effects, Commonwealth Heads of Government continuously emphasize their commitment to 
tackling corruption. As a part of this process, a number of anti-corruption projects have been initiated in several 
Commonwealth countries. 
In recent years, many fastest-growing economies, such as, Malaysia, India, South Africa, Guyana, Bangladesh, 
Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Nigeria and Tanzania have seen expansion of supply of financial services which can be 
accessed by the poor, thereby, increasing income growth for the poor, and reducing income inequality. Also, at 
the same time, corruption among public officials, civil servants or politicians of these countries deterring the 
benefits of financial sector development. We focus our study to Commonwealth countries as many middle- and 
low-income Commonwealth countries are fastest-growing economies with the improvements in the formal 
financial sector. The availability of more financial services benefits the poor as they can borrow to invest in 
human and physical capital. 
These transition economies are bank dominated, which mostly lend to government, non-bank financial 
institutions, or short-term working capital to enterprises. However, capital markets are not sufficiently large and 
institutional investors or intermediaries such as pension funds or insurance companies that mobilize the savings 
of individuals and hold capital market instruments are just getting started. Access to international capital 
markets facilitates the flow of portfolio investments in those countries. 
The mobilization of savings is perhaps the most important function of the financial sector development. It 
enables the poor to transform their savings into productivity-enhancing assets, thus increasing capital 
accumulation and stimulating investment. Access to credit can reduce the vulnerability of the poor to any 
income shocks in the absence of savings or insurance. Therefore, access to credit and availability of information 
is likely to decrease the proportion of low-risk, low-return assets held by poor households, and enable them to 
invest in potentially higher risk but higher return long-term income enhancing assets (Deaton, 1992). 
These facilities reduce the vulnerability, and minimize the negative impact of shocks on long-run income 
prospects of the poor, thereby, reducing income inequality. As a result, few Commonwealth countries, such as, 
Malaysia, India and South Africa, which were plagued with institutional backwardness and macroeconomic 
instability, have crossed the divide to emerging markets economies. 
Previous research suggests that both corruption and financial development are separately important 
determinants of income inequality. However, there has been no attempt in the literature to study whether the 
return to financial development on income inequality change at the level of higher corruption. This article seeks 
to address this gap in the literature. The following questions are examined: Do the policies to control corruption 
and boost financial development serve as complements in reducing inequality? How the return to financial 
development on income inequality, at the level of higher corruption, vary across low-, middle-, and high-income 
countries? 
The convergence of widespread corruption among public officials and the financial architecture development 
among the middle- and low-income countries raise fundamental question about how financial development 
interacts with corruption in influencing income inequality. Corruption is seen as aggravating conditions of 
inequality in countries which are now experiencing higher economic growth through financial sector 
development. This study contributes to the literature by trying to bring these two strands together. In particular, 
it analyzes the distributional impact of corruption and financial development on income inequality using a cross 
section of 30 Commonwealth countries over the 1995–2008 period. 
II Literature review 
The first section discusses the previous literature on corruption and income inequality, and the second 
section reviews the past literature about financial development and income inequality. 
1 Corruption—Income inequality nexus 
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It is generally understood as the abuse of 
government office to extract rent in the provision of public services. It is one of the leading obstacles to political, 
economic and social development. It undermines the rule of law and weakens the institutional bases of good 
governance upon which continued growth and development depends. It is the poor in society that are often the 
hardest hit by the effects of corruption, being the most reliant on public services and the least capable of paying 
the high price associated with fraud, bribery and other forms of corrupt activity, to attain those services. 
The theoretical foundations for the corruption–inequality relationship are derived from the rent theory and 
draw on the ideas of Rose-Ackerman (1978), Krueger (1974) and Klitgaard (1988), among others. The 
propositions include: 
• Corruption may distort the government’s role in resource allocation. The benefits from corruption are 
likely to accrue more to the better-connected individuals in society, who belong mostly to the high-
income groups (Tanzi, 1995). 
• The impact of corruption on income distribution is in part a function of government involvement in 
allocating and financing scarce goods and services (Gupta et al., 2002). 
• As inequality increases, the rich will also have greater resources that can be used to buy influence, both 
legally and illegally (Glaeser et al., 2003). 
The ‘economic model’ of corruption inequality postulates that corruption impedes economic growth, which, in 
turn, affects poverty levels. Few channels through which corruption slows down economic growth and 
aggravates income inequality are discussed in the following. 
• High corruption can lead to lower economic growth: If corruption increases income inequality, it will 
slow down the rate of poverty reduction by reducing growth (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Ravallion, 
1997). 
• High concentration of asset ownership can influence public policy and increase income inequality: 
Inequality in ownership of assets will limit the ability of the poor to borrow or invest and will accentuate 
poverty and income inequality (Birdsall and Londoño, 1997; Li et al., 1998). 
• Corruption decreases revenue from taxes and fees: Corruption can lead to tax evasion, poor tax 
administration, disproportionately favour the wealthy population groups and reduce the progressivity of 
the tax system, resulting in increased income inequality. 
Gupta et al. (2002) estimate the models of income inequality and poverty using OLS and instrumental variables 
(IV) techniques on a cross-section of countries over the 1980–97 period. They find that higher corruption is 
associated with higher income inequality such that a worsening of a country’s corruption index by one standard 
deviation (2.52 points on a scale of 0 to 10) corresponds to an increase in the Gini coefficient (worsening 
inequality) by about 11 points, given the average Gini coefficient value of 39.2 You and Khagram (2005) find the 
evidence of reverse causality that income inequality increases the level of corruption through material and 
normative mechanisms. Gyimah-Brempong (2002) finds that increased corruption is positively correlated with 
income inequality in African countries. The combined effects of decreased income growth and increased 
inequality suggest that corruption hurts the poor more than the rich. 
In summary, the literature establishes the fact that corruption hinders economic growth and augments income 
inequalities. The evidence from diagnostic surveys of corruption in several countries suggests that corruption 
aggravates income inequality because lower income households pay a higher proportion of their income in 
bribes. 
2 Financial development—Income inequality nexus 
Levine (2005: 869), define financial development as: 
The costs of acquiring information, enforcing contracts, and making transactions create incentives for the emergence of 
particular types of financial contracts, markets and intermediaries. Different types and combinations of information, 
enforcement, and transaction costs in conjunction with different legal, regulatory, and tax systems have motivated distinct 
financial contracts, markets, and intermediaries across countries and throughout history. 
Theory provides conflicting predictions about the impact of financial development on the distribution of income 
and the incomes of the poor. Some models show that financial development enhances growth and reduces 
inequality. Financial development may affect the poor through two channels: aggregate growth and changes in 
the distribution of income (Beck et al., 2007). They find that financial development disproportionately boosts 
incomes of the poorest quintile and reduces income inequality. About 40 percent of the long-run impact of 
financial development on the income growth of the poorest quintile is the result of reductions in income 
inequality, while 60 percent is due to the impact of financial development on aggregate economic growth. 
Other models illustrate financial imperfections, such as, information asymmetries and transactions costs, may be 
especially binding on the poor who lack collateral and credit histories. Thus, strict enforcement of these credit 
constraints will disproportionately affect the poor. Furthermore, these credit constraints reduce the efficiency of 
capital allocation and intensify income inequality by impeding the flow of capital to poor individuals (Galor and 
Moav, 2004). From this perspective, financial development helps the poor both by improving the efficiency of 
capital allocation and by relaxing credit constraints that more extensively restrain the poor, which, in turn, 
reduces income inequality. 
The theoretical predictions of the effects of financial sector development on income inequality are not 
unanimous. In the seminal study on the distribution of income, Kuznets (1955) conjectures that there may be an 
inverted u-shaped relationship between income inequality and economic development. As people move from 
the low-income agricultural sector to the high-income industrial sector, income inequality initially increases. 
However, as the agricultural sector shrinks and agricultural wages increase, this trend reverses and income 
inequality decreases. In addition, the sectoral structure is important for the relation between economic 
development and income inequality suggests that financial development may reduce inequality to a lesser 
extent in countries with larger modern sectors (i.e., smaller agricultural sectors). 
Building on the Kuznets’ hypothesis, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) predict a nonlinear relationship between 
financial development and income inequality, where it is hypothesized that income inequality first increases 
with the degree of sophistication in the financial systems, then stabilizes and eventually declines—as more 
people join financial coalitions (the inverted-U shaped hypothesis). 
Bhattacharya (2011) using a numerical simulation finds conflicting evidence on the inverted-U hypothesis 
relating to income distribution in the context of development of an economy with an informal sector and 
migration of both low and high skilled workers from the rural to the urban area. He asserts that the Gini 
coefficient always initially rises and then declines. However, once it starts declining, it need not continuously 
decline; it may rise, then decline, then rise again and indeed rise above the previous peak before starting to 
decline again and may well end at the end of the simulation at a higher value than at the start. He argues that 
the movement of Gini coefficient over time depends crucially on the evolution of the gap between the formal 
and the informal sector wage. 
Contrary to Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993) 
suggest that long-run convergence in the income levels of rich and poor will not necessarily happen in 
economies with capital market imperfections and indivisibilities in investment in human or physical capital. 
Taking the financial market frictions as given, these models suggest that public policies that redistribute income 
from the rich to the poor will alleviate the adverse growth effects of income inequality and therefore boost 
aggregate growth. Consequently, they predict a negative and linear relationship between financial development 
and income inequality (the linear hypothesis).3 
Given that theories provide ambiguous predictions regarding the effects of financial development on the 
distribution of income, it is useful to approach the issue at the empirical level. Using data for 91 countries over 
the period 1960–95, Clarke et al. (2003) examine the effect of financial development on the level of Gini 
coefficient. They find that financial intermediary development is associated with lower income inequality. 
Moreover, consistent with the insight of Kuznets, the relation between the Gini coefficient and financial 
intermediary development appears to depend upon the sectoral structure of the economy: a larger modern 
sector is associated with a smaller drop in the Gini coefficient for the same level of financial intermediary 
development. They find evidence against the inverted-U shape hypothesis—the coefficient on the squared term 
for the financial intermediary indicators is never statistically significant and, in fact, often has the wrong sign. 
III Data 
The data are collected from a number of different sources. The dependent variable, income inequality, 
measured by the Gini coefficient, is drawn from the World Development Poverty Indicator, World Bank. Our first 
key independent variable, corruption is inherently a secretive transaction, and thus difficult to observe and 
measure. Several organizations, including the World Bank, Transparency International and Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers Foundations, have attempted to develop corruption indicators; all of which depend on aggregate 
surveys of citizens, businesses or experts and therefore, based on the perceptions of the corruption as opposed 
to more objective data. While these measurement approaches have acknowledged reliability and validity 
problems, they are the best available data (Management Systems International, 2002). Following Gupta et 
al. (2002) and Gyimah-Brempong (2002), Transparency International’s CPI4 is used as the measure for 
corruption. It ranges from zero (most corrupt) to nine (least corrupt). 
Two different indicators are used for financial development. Each indicator captures a different aspect of the 
financial development process. The first indicator is the inverse of the broad-money income velocity, that is, the 
ratio of M2 to nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and is also known as the monetization ratio. King and 
Levine (1993) use this monetization ratio to represent the depth (size) of the financial market relative to the 
overall economy. Increases in monetization ratio indicate further expansion in the financial sector relative to the 
rest of the economy. 
The second indicator of financial development is credit issued by financial institutions to the non-financial 
private sector as a share of GDP. It reflects the extent to which financial services are provided to the private 
sector. Denizer et al. (2002) argue that availability of credit to the private sector helps to explain the volatility of 
consumption and GDP.5 
As in other studies of inequality (e.g., Bourguignon and Morrison, 1998; Gupta et al., 2002; Lundberg and 
Squire, 2003; Reuveny and Li, 2003; Easterly et al., 2006; and Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2010) the 
model also includes the following control variables: GDP growth (annual percentage), primary completion rate 
(percentage of relevant age group), market capitalization of listed companies (percentage of GDP), real interest 
rate (percent), openness (percentage in constant prices). Data for these variables are taken from a number of 
sources—the Worldwide Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank; International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF); World Bank and OECD national accounts data files; UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics; Transparency International (TI); Standard & Poor’s, Global Stock Markets Factbook; Penn World 
Tables, Version 7.0.6 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the full sample and by three income categories averaged over the period 
1995–2008. As expected, our sample shows the Gini coefficient is lowest for the high-income countries and 
highest for the low-income countries.7 It ranges from less than 30 in Cyprus and Australia to more than 52 in 
Zimbabwe, Swaziland, South Africa, Lesotho and Belize. Consequently, higher inequality is expected in low- or 
middle-income countries compared to high-income countries. 
Table 1 Summary statistics of the variables in the database 
  Obs Mean Sd. Obs Mean Sd. Obs Mean Sd. Obs Mean Sd. 
Variables   Aggregate   Low 
income 
  Middle 
income 
  High 
income 
 
Gini Coefficient overall N = 420 43.45 8.85 N = 154 45.87   7.23 N = 196 44.22 8.84 N = 70 34.95 6.90 
 between   n = 30  8.36 n = 11  6.38 n = 14  8.55 n = 5  7.38 
 within  T = 14  3.27 T = 14  3.87 T = 14  3.16 T = 14  1.86 
GDP growth (Annual 
%) 
overall    N = 420 4.29 3.96 N = 154 4.53 5.00 N = 196 4.21 3.41 N = 70 3.99 2.56 
 between   n = 30  2.10 n = 11  2.69 n = 14  1.92 n = 5  1.30 
 within  T = 14  3.37 T = 14  4.29 T = 14  2.86 T = 14  2.30 
Primary completion 
rate (% of relevant age 
group) 
overall  N = 420 78.73 22.34 N = 154 66.31 18.45 N = 196 82.25 23.64 N = 70 96.18 2.74 
 between  n = 30  21.73 n = 11  17.36 n = 14  23.65 n = 5  2.13 
 within    T = 14  6.43 T = 14  8.05 T = 14  6.05 T = 14  1.95 
Corruption (CPI score) overall  N = 420 3.87 2.30 N = 154 2.65 0.72 N = 196 3.21 1.14 N = 70 8.44 1.26 
 between  n = 30  2.30 n = 11  0.57 n = 14  1.11 n = 5  1.38 
 within  T = 14  0.40 T = 14  0.46 T = 14  0.39 T = 14  0.24 
Democracy overall  N = 420 5.09 3.49 N = 154 3.37 2.72 N = 196 5.27 3.21 N = 70 8.40 3.22 
 between  n = 30  3.27 n = 11  2.22 n = 14  3.06 n = 5  3.58 
 within  T = 14  1.34 T = 14  1.70 T = 14  1.25 T = 14  0.00 
General government 
final consumption 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
overall   N = 420 14.83 5.77 N = 154 12.80 4.15 N = 196 15.84 6.99 N = 70 16.46 3.29 
 between  n = 30  5.40 n = 11  3.23 n = 14  6.90 n = 5  3.49 
 within  T = 14  2.25 T = 14  2.77 T = 14  2.11 T = 14  0.95 
Money and quasi 
money (M2) (% of 
GDP) 
overall  N = 420 48.24 36.84 N = 154 25.05 10.48 N = 196 46.25 27.72 N = 70 104.84 36.92 
 between  n = 30  36.08 n = 11  9.25 n = 14  27.77 n = 5  34.94 
 within  T = 14  9.77 T = 14  5.62 T = 14  6.97 T = 14  19.30 
Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of 
GDP) 
overall  N = 420 48.00 54.50 N = 154 14.77 10.05 N = 196 44.05 45.54 N = 70 132.19 47.49 
 between  n = 30  53.65 n = 11  9.76 n = 14  44.90 n = 5  46.14 
 within  T = 14  13.47 T = 14  3.74 T = 14  13.86 T = 14  22.97 
Market capitalization 
of listed companies (% 
of GDP) 
overall  N = 420 43.40 55.45 N = 154 15.42 16.67 N = 196 47.33 60.14 N = 70 93.95 58.71 
 between  n = 30  51.37 n = 11  14.28 n = 14  56.40 n = 5  53.69 
 within  T = 14  22.75 T = 14  9.57 T = 14  25.46 T = 14  33.27 
Real interest rate (%) overall   N = 420 8.09 8.33 N = 154 10.34 11.09 N = 196 7.33 6.55 N = 70 5.25 2.54 
 between  n = 30  5.11 n = 11  6.28 n = 14  4.36 n = 5  1.68 
 within   T = 14  6.64 T = 14  9.32 T = 14  5.02 T = 14  2.04 
Openness (% in 
constant prices) 
overall  N = 420 89.05 70.47 N = 154 56.46 23.10 N = 196 101.31 55.80 N = 70 126.45 126.34 
 between  n = 30  69.96 n = 11  20.37 n = 14  56.09 n = 5  137.94 
 within    T = 14  14.97 T = 14  12.40 T = 14  13.31 T = 14  22.79 
 
There is a wide variation in corruption (CPI), ranging from less than 2 in Bangladesh and Nigeria to 
more than 8 in Australia, Canada, Singapore and New Zealand for the period 1995–2008. It shows that 
the high-income countries are going to be less corrupt compared to the low- or middle-income 
countries and this difference is significantly large. 
The financial development indicators for the high-income countries have been the highest, and the 
financial development indicators for the middle-income countries are between the low- and high-
income countries. The money and quasi money (M2) is ranging from less than 20 percent of GDP in 
Cameroon, Malawi, Sierra Leon, Uganda, Zambia and Nigeria to more than 100 percent of GDP in 
Singapore, Canada, Malaysia and Cyprus. The domestic credit to private sector varies from less than 10 
percent of GDP in Sierra Leon, Malawi, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon and Zambia to more than 100 
percent of GDP in Singapore, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, Malaysia and Cyprus. 
As expected, GDP growth is lowest for the high-income countries. Primary completion rate, market 
capitalization and openness for the middle-income countries are between the low- and high-income 
countries. Real interest rate is highest in the low-income countries. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix of the variables the database. The corruption index is multiplied 
by −1 so that a high value of the corruption index indicates a high level of corruption. As expected, 
corruption is positively correlated with income inequality. Both the indicators of financial sector 
development are negatively correlated with the Gini coefficient. The pairwise correlations indicate that 
income inequality is lower in countries with deeper financial markets. The two indicators of financial 
development are positively correlated with each other. 
Table 2 Correlation matrix 















GDP growth (Annual %) −0.1777        
Primary completion rate (% of relevant 
age group) 
−0.0743  0.1743       
Corruption −0.2498  −0.0067 −0.1802      
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of 
GDP 
−0.3307  0.0239 0.1093 −0.5492     
Domestic credit to private sector (% of 
GDP) 
−0.2438  0.0436 0.1175 −0.5718 0.9135    
Market capitalization of listed 
companies (% of GDP) 
0.0453  0.0281 0.0585 −0.5649 0.5516 0.5460   
Real interest rate (%)  −0.0456  0.2706 0.0532 0.1165 −0.2005 −0.2140 −0.2334  
Openness in Constant Prices (%) 0.2210  0.0908 0.1808 −0.3417 0.3971 0.2803 0.4276 −0.0980 
 
To visualize the relation between the Gini coefficient and corruption, Figure 1 plots the Gini coefficient and the 
fitted values from the regression of the Gini coefficient on the corruption index against the corruption index. The 
plot in Figure 1 suggests a positive, and possible linear relationship between corruption and income inequality. 





IV The model 
In modelling the relationship among income inequality, corruption and financial development, panel data from 
the period 1995–2008 are used for 30 Commonwealth countries.8 The complete list of the countries by income 
category is given in Appendix B. The dataset is divided into three income categories by Gross National Income 
(GNI) level using the World Bank Atlas Method. These three income categories are low-, middle-9 and high-
income countries.10 Following Barro (2000) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) the following specification is 
estimated: 
(Income Inequality)it = β0 + β1 (Corruption)it+ β2 (Financial Development)it+ β3 (Corruption * Financial 
Development)it+ β4Vit + β5 μi + εit                        (1) 
where Income Inequality, Corruption and Financial Development are measured for country i at time t. Vit is a 
vector of other control variables for country i at time t. The parameter ni contains constant country-specific 
variables that are invariant over time and fit is the random error term.11 The variables in the model are measured 
by: 
• Income Inequality: Gini coefficient. 
• Corruption: CPI. 
• Financial Development: (M2) as percentage of GDP; and Domestic credit to private sector (percentage of 
GDP). 
V Empirical results 
Tables 3–5 report the OLS and IV estimation results with and without interaction terms for corruption and 
financial development for low-, middle- and high-income countries, respectively. The IV technique addresses the 
endogeneity of the corruption variable. The income inequality regression is estimated using four specifications. 
In the first one, the Gini coefficient is regressed on a constant, GDP growth, primary completion rate, corruption 
index and the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP, market capitalization of listed companies, real interest rate and 
openness. In the second specification, the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP is replaced with domestic credit to the 
private sector as a share of GDP. The third specification includes all variables in the first specification plus an 
interaction term between corruption and the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP. Similarly, the fourth specification 
includes all variables in the second specification plus an interaction term between corruption and domestic 
credit to the private sector as a share of GDP. 
Tables 3–5 (columns 1–4) report the results for all these four specifications for the OLS technique. The results 
suggest that countries with low GDP growth and low primary completion rate are associated with high income 
inequality. The signs of market capitalization of listed companies, real interest rate and openness vary with the 
income levels of the countries. Higher income inequality tends to be associated with a higher percentage of 
market capitalization of listed companies as a share of GDP for the middle- and high-income countries whereas 
just the opposite holds for the low-income countries. The low- and high-income countries with a higher 
percentage of openness and low real interest rates are associated with higher income inequality, even though 
coefficients are not significant at the conventional statistical levels in many cases. 
As regards the impact of corruption on income inequality, higher corruption is associated with higher income 
inequality. The coefficients of corruption are always positive and statistically significant in almost all of the 
specifications. The higher the corruption index, (higher corruption), the higher is the inequality. This result 
supports the earlier findings of Gupta et al. (2002). 
The signs of the two financial development variables are always negative and significant, indicating that the 
higher the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP or domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP, the lower the 
inequality irrespective of the income level of the countries. Therefore, it is evident from the results that 
emergence of better-developed financial markets and intermediaries in many middle- and low-income 
Commonwealth countries, have assisted these countries to reduce income inequalities. These results support 
the previous findings of Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) and Clarke et al. (2003). 
The results show that financial sector development negatively influences income inequality, though its impacts 
on inequality are dramatically reversed in the presence of massive corruption by the public officials, civil 
servants, or politicians in many low- and middle-income countries. For example, greater financial development is 
associated with significantly lower income inequality, but when corruption intervenes, income inequality is 
exacerbated, negating the benefits of financial development. 
Table 3 OLS and IV estimates – income inequality (Gini coefficient), corruption and financial development (low-income countries) 
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Interaction terms:         
Corruption*(M2/GDP)   1.1579* 
(0.6920)  
   2.8508† 
(1.4251) 
 
Corruption*(Domestic credit to private sector 
(% of GDP)) 
   1.7098* 
(0.9841)  
   3.5203* 
(2.0955) 


















































Adjusted R-sq 0.3178  0.3304 0.3272 0.3387 0.3402 0.3652 0.3497 0.3741 
Number of observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 154 
Notes: The estimation includes 11 low-income Commonwealth countries. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1 for estimation. This table reports the OLS and IV estimates and the standard errors. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. A high value of 
the corruption index indicates a high level of corruption. The symbols §, † and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Table 4 OLS and IV estimates – income inequality (Gini coefficient), corruption and financial development (middle-income countries) 
Dependent Variable: Gini coefficient         
 OLS estimation 
results 
   IV estimation 
results 
   

































Primary completion rate −0.1774† −0.1385* −0.1602† −0.0690* −0.1904† −0.1497* −0.0711 −0.0836 
(% of relevant age group) (0.0754) (0.0725) (0.0767) (0.0382) (0.0944) (0.0862) (0.1080) (0.0892) 
Corruption 0.2958* 0.2368 0.6418§ 0.5933§ 0.6893* 0.5784 2.5453† 1.9839§ 
Financial development: (0.1618) (0.2127) (0.3242) (0.1937) (0.3984) (0.6298) (1.2396) (0.7037) 
Money and quasi money  −0.2213*   −1.1506§   −0.2822*   −3.4477†   
M2 (% of gDP) (0.1294)  (0.4464)  (0.1671)  (1.6818)  
Domestic credit to private  −0.3125§  −0.8099†  −0.3087§  −2.9183§ 
sector (% of gDP)  (0.1124)  (0.3357)  (0.1225)  (0.8295) 
Market capitalization of listed 

















































Interaction terms:         
Corruption*(M2/gDP) 
 








Corruption*(Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of GDP)) 
   0.5614§ 
(0.2075) 
   1.5828§ 
(0.4011) 
F-statistic 29.73  25.69  30.97  26.04 3.59  2.72  4.73 5.57 
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0007)  (0.0076)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 




































Adjusted R-sq  0.5872  0.4613  0.5904  0.4887  0.6203  0.5268  0.6394  0.5421 
Number of observations  196  196  196  196  196  196  196  196 
Notes: The estimation includes 14 middle-income Commonwealth countries. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1 for estimation. This table reports the OLS and IV estimates and the standard errors. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. A high value 
of the corruption index indicates a high level of corruption. The symbols §, † and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 5 OLS and IV estimates – income inequality (Gini coefficient), corruption and financial development (high-income countries) 
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estimation 
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Financial development:         




























Market capitalization of listed 

































Openness in constant prices (%) 0.2736† 0.4046§ 0.2580† 0.3837§ 0.5133§ 0.5483§ 0.4402§ 0.5265§ 
(0.1302) (0.0382) (0.1262) (0.1408) (0.0479) (0.0490) (0.0661) (0.0571) 
Interaction terms: 
Corruption*(M2/gDP) 
  0.2830† 
(0.1279) 
   0.4819* 
(0.2832) 
 
Corruption*(Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of gDP)) 
   0.2018* 
(0.1174) 

























 (0.0005)  
30.38 


























 (0.2113) ( 
1.92 
0.1657) 
Adjusted R-sq  0.7312  0.7208  0.7327  0.7215  0.7510  0.7451  0.7573  0.7492 
Number of observations  70  70  70  70  70  70  70  70 
Notes: The estimation includes five high-income Commonwealth countries. All variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1 for estimation. This table reports the OLS and IV estimates and the standard errors. Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. A high value 
of the corruption index indicates a high level of corruption. The symbols §, † and * denote the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively 
1 The instrumental variables (IV) estimation of the income inequality regression 
The OLS regression results establish the existence of a statistically significant positive association between 
corruption and income inequality. However, this association could stem from reverse causation, that is, high 
income inequality can lead to higher corruption and/or the observed association could be due to other factors 
affecting both. The IV technique can help to address these problems. Therefore, the choice of the instrument is 
important. A valid instrument for the corruption should be highly correlated with it, but not correlated with the 
error term in the income inequality regression or the income inequality itself (the Gini coefficient) other than its 
impact on the Gini coefficient through the corruption index. 
Following Gupta et al. (2002) and Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010), democracy and ratio of government 
final consumption expenditure to GDP are used as the instruments for corruption. Treisman (2000) finds a 
variable measuring length of exposure to democracy to be a robust determinant of corruption. In addition, 
democracy is not associated with income inequality, as shown by Barro (1999). Therefore, democracy seems to 
be a good instrument for corruption. The democracy variable used in this article is taken from the Polity IV 
database of the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). Countries with high values on the democracy indicator are 
perceived to be less corrupt. The impact of corruption may also increase with the scale of government 
intervention in the economy. In this regard, the ratio of government final consumption expenditure to GDP is 
used as the other instrument of corruption. Data for the ratio of government final consumption expenditure is 
taken from the World Development Economic Policy & External Debt Indicator of the World Bank. 
The results of the IV technique using democracy and ratio of government final consumption expenditure to GDP 
as the instruments are shown in columns 5–8 of Tables 3–5 for the same specification as in the OLS regression. 
Results are much stronger than the OLS version: significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficient on 
corruption, financial development and their joint effects increase in all the specifications. 
The point estimates suggest that a worsening in the corruption index of the low- and middle-income countries 
by one standard deviation (sd) decreases income inequality by about 1.6–2.6 sds (see Tables 3–4, columns 7–8), 
from the mean value, at the average values of the respective financial development indicators. 
Similarly, the point estimates suggest that an improvement in the financial infrastructure development of the 
low-income countries by one sd, decreases income inequality by about 3 sds (see Table 3, column 7) or 6 sds 
(see Table 3, column 8) from the mean value, when the average value of the corruption (CPI) is 2.65. An increase 
of one sd in financial development of the middle-income countries decreases income inequality by about 3 sds 
(see Table 4, columns 7–8), when the average value of the corruption (CPI) is 3.21. 
The individual effects of corruption and financial development on income inequality tend to be the lowest in the 
high-income countries compared to the low- or middle-income countries. The chosen instruments are valid at 
the conventional statistical levels in all regressions as judged by Sargan’s test of over-identifying restrictions.12 
2 Interaction terms 
In general, the results indicate that a worsening corruption index or an improvement in the financial 
infrastructure development separately leads to lower income inequality. When interacted, the results indicate 
the complementary nature of the relationship between corruption and financial development in influencing 
income inequality – at the level of higher corruption, the marginal impact of greater financial development 
exacerbates income inequality rather than reducing it. This finding has significant policy implications for many 
low- and middle-income countries. 
Corruption discourages financial sector development – because bribes, kickbacks and other forms of illicit 
payments to get financial services increase uncertainty and reduce profitability. Additionally, financial market 
imperfections, asymmetric information regarding availability of financial services are likely to affect 
disproportionately the poor more than the rich, especially given that the poor have less diversified sources of 
income. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that improvements in the formal financial sector primarily benefit the 
rich as the poor may be incapacitated when they do not have access to finance. 
The interaction terms of corruption and financial development are all positive and significant irrespective of the 
income levels of the countries. More specifically, positive interactions terms reveal that return to financial 
development depend on the level of corruption. Therefore, policies to reduce corruption and boost financial 
development should be complementary in nature especially for the low- and middle-income countries. This 
result is more important given the moderate correlation between corruption and financial development, which 
leaves less variation in estimating the relationship. 
For low-income countries with corruption (CPI) 2 sds above the mean, an increase in financial development by 
one sd, increases income inequality by about 2.5 sds (see Table 3, column 7) or 1 sd (see Table 3, column 8) from 
the mean value. Similarly, if corruption (CPI) is 2 sds above its mean value, an increase of one sd in financial 
development of the middle-income countries increases income inequality by about 2.1 sds (see Table 4, column 
7) or 0.25 sds (see Table 4, column 8) from the mean value. 
The high-income countries with corruption (CPI) 2 sds above the mean, an increase in financial development by 
one sd, decreases income inequality by about 0.2 sds (see Table 3, column 7) or 0.9 sd (see Table 3, column 8) 
from the mean value. These high-income countries already have a well-developed financial sector. The financial 
sector of these countries is dominated by capital market. Therefore, return to financial development, at the 
level of higher corruption, on income inequality is different in high-income countries compared to low- and 
middle-income countries. Higher corruption in high-income countries do not crowd out the full benefits of 
financial development in reducing income inequality in every instance as there are structural differences of the 
financial sector formulation in high-income countries as opposed to low- and middle-income countries. 
These estimates confirm that the return to financial development are higher for those countries with lower 
corruption. The adverse effects of corruption, in reversing the benefits financial sector development on income 
inequality, are higher for the low- and middle-income countries compared to the high-income countries. 
Eradicating corruption is a challenging task, especially because it is a systemic phenomenon that exhibits a 
strong tendency for hysteresis. The results suggest that in order to realize the benefits from the growthspurring 
effects of financial sector development in reducing inequality, these countries should establish norms to curb 
corruption of government officials in the public domain with proper institutional reform, to enforce contracts 
and property rights, to minimize transaction costs, to simplify tax and tariff schedules, to build strong legal 
frameworks with independent judiciaries and to cut bureaucratic red tape for efficient decision-making. 
VI Concluding remarks 
This article is one of the first attempts to study the interactive effects of corruption and financial development 
on income inequality in 30 Commonwealth countries over the sample period of 1995–2008. Financial 
development is measured by the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP and domestic credit to the private sector as a 
share of GDP. The results from the OLS and IV estimations suggest that lower corruption or greater financial 
development, individually, leads to lower levels of income inequality. The return to financial development at the 
level of higher corruption impair income inequality, suggesting that combining policies that simultaneously 
reduce corruption and promote financial development will have a greater impact in reducing income inequality 
than implementing these policies separately. For example, effective anti-corruption legislation, especially in the 
public domain, will ensure that the potential of financial development to improve income equality is fully 
realized. On the other hand, absence of such measures will partially, if not fully, compromise such potential. 
In recent years, many middle- and low-income Commonwealth countries, for example, Malaysia, India, South 
Africa, Guyana, Bangladesh, Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Nigeria and Tanzania, have seen improvements in financial 
sector by establishing stronger institutions. Overall, results in this study suggest that the growth-spurring effects 
of financial intermediary development are likely to be associated with positive effects on aggregate income 
distribution. The deterring effect of corruption, however, appears to erode the benefits of financial 
development in reducing income inequality. Countries with growing financial sectors need to establish checks 
and balances and the rule of law, among other things, for effective monitoring of corruption, particularly in the 
public sector. 
VII Appendix 
A1 Definitions and sources of the variables in the database 
Gini coefficient: The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality. It measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A value of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 
100 implies perfect inequality. 
Source: World Development Indicators, Poverty, World Bank; Trading Economics. 
GDP growth (Annual percentage): Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant 
local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all 
resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of 
the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. 
Source: World Bank national accounts data; and OECD National Accounts data files. 
Primary completion rate (percentage of relevant age group): Primary completion rate is the percentage of 
students completing the last year of primary school. It is calculated by taking the total number of students in the 
last grade of primary school, minus the number of repeaters in that grade, divided by the total number of 
children of official graduation age. 
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics. 
Corruption (CPI score): The Transparency International defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials, civil servants or politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 
corruption-related data in expert surveys carried out by a variety of reputable institutions. The CPI ranking run 
on a scale is from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). 
Source: Transparency International. 
Money and quasi money (M2) as percentage of GDP: Money and quasi money comprise the sum of currency 
outside banks, demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings and foreign 
currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government. This definition of money supply is 
frequently called M2; it corresponds to lines 34 and 35 in the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files; World Bank; and OECD GDP estimates. 
Domestic credit to private sector (percentage of GDP): Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade 
credits and other accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims 
include credit to public enterprises. 
Source: World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, World Bank. 
Democracy: Institutionalized democracy is conceived as three essential, interdependent elements. One is the 
presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative policies and leaders. Second is the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power 
by the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation. The democracy indicator is an additive eleven-point scale 0 (autocracy)–10 (full democracy). 
Source: Polity IV Project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010, Center for Systemic Peace (CSP). 
General government final consumption expenditure (percentage of GDP): General government final consumption 
expenditure includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including 
compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes 
government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation. 
Source: World Development (Economic Policy & External Debt) Indicator, World Bank. 
Market capitalization of listed companies (percentage of GDP): Market capitalization (also known as market 
value) is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. Listed domestic companies are the 
domestically incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed 
companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. 
Source: Standard & Poor’s; Global Stock Markets Factbook; World Bank; and OECD GDP estimates. 
Real interest rate (percent): Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by 
the GDP deflator. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files using World Bank data on the GDP 
deflator. 
Openness in Constant Prices (percentage): The extent to which an economy is open to trade, and sometimes also 
to inflows and outflows of international investment. Openness is calculated at 2005 constant prices 
(percentage). 
Source: Pen World Table 7.0. 
B2 List of countries in the database 
Low-income countries: Bangladesh, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leon, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Middle-income countries: Belize, Cameroon, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Lesotho, Malaysia, Maldives, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Swaziland. 
High-income countries: Australia, Canada, Cyprus, New Zealand and Singapore. 
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Notes 
1.The Commonwealth countries, normally referred to as the Commonwealth and formerly known as the British 
Commonwealth, is an intergovernmental organization of 53 independent member countries. All 
members except Mozambique and Rwanda were part of the British Empire, out of which the 
Commonwealth developed. The member countries cooperate within a framework of common values 
and goals, for the promotion of democracy, human rights, good governance, the rule of law, individual 
liberty, egalitarianism, free trade, multilateralism and world peace. 
2.They also find that a one-standard deviation increase in the growth rate of corruption (a deterioration of 0.78 
percent points) reduces income growth of the poor by about 5 percent points per year, given the 
average income growth of 0.6 percent a year. 
3.Further research that supports the negative relationship between financial development and income 
inequality is Kappel (2010) who suggests inequality and poverty are reduced through well-developed 
loan and stock markets. He also finds evidence that government spending reduces income inequality in 
high-income countries but not in low-income countries. 
4.It focuses on corruption in the public sector, or corruption which involves public officials, civil servants or 
politicians. It covers both the administrative and political aspects of corruption. 
5.Levine et al. (2000) show a robust positive relationship between private credit and the growth rate of GDP per 
capita. 
6.The definitions and sources of the variables in the database are provided in Appendix A. 
7.The average Gini coefficient of the middle-income countries is very close to that of the low-income countries. 
8.Due to unavailability of data for all the variables, this study is restricted to 30 Commonwealth countries 
instead of total 54 countries. The missing values in the dataset are imputed by calculating the mean of 
the adjacent values of the variables. 
9.The middle-income countries include both the lower-middle- and upper-middle-income countries. 
10.The economies are divided according to 2010 GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. 
The groups are: low-income, $1,005 or less; middle-income, $1,006 to $12,275; and high-income, 
$12,276 or more. There are 14 countries in the middle-income group. Out of these countries, only 
Jamaica, Malaysia and South Africa have GNI per capita between $3,976 and $12,275. The other 11 
countries in the middle-income group have GNI per capita between $1,006 and $3,975. 
11.Since 2008 was a turbulent year in economic history, with a world-wide economic recession, a 2008 year 
dummy was also controlled but not reported in the regression result. The squared terms for corruption 
and financial development indicators are also used. The coefficients are never statistically significant 
and, in fact, often have opposite signs. 
12.The null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the IV regression models 
which are well below conventional rejection levels. 
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